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Buddhist philosophers have developed a rich tradition of logic. Buddhist material on logic
that forms the Buddhist tradition of logic, however, is hardly discussed or even known.
This article presents some of that material in a manner that is accessible to contemporary
logicians and philosophers of logic and sets agendas for global philosophy of logic.
1 Buddhist Logic
Buddhist philosophers have examined techniques and methodologies of debate
and argumentation. They have investigated the logical principles that underlie
rational argumentation and reasoning. These investigations started in India and
engaged philosophers in China, Japan, Korea and Tibet. Many competing theo-
ries of logic and its relation to reasoning and rationality have been developed and
studied by traditional and contemporary Buddhist scholars.1 In the contemporary
literature on logic and the philosophy of logic, however, this rich Buddhist mate-
rial on logic is hardly discussed or even known. This article presents some of that
1For a history of logic in India including Buddhist logic, see Matilal (1999). For a history of
logic and its related issues in Tibet, see Dreyfus (1997). A history of Buddhist logic in China,
Japan and Korea has yet to be written as far as I know.
material in a manner that is accessible to contemporary logicians and philosophers
of logic and sets agendas for global philosophy of logic.
There is a large amount of material that can be presented as part of the devel-
opment of logic in Buddhist philosophical traditions. In order to provide a focus,
I will be mostly concerned with the study of anuma¯na (often translated as ‘in-
ference’) by two of the major Indian Buddhist logicians Digna¯ga¯ (480-540 CE)
and Dharmakı¯rti (6th or 7th CE – dates unknown) and the tradition of philosophy,
sometimes called prama¯n. ava¯da, that sprung up based on their philosophy. ‘Bud-
dhist logicians’ in this article refer mainly to Digna¯ga¯, Dharmakı¯rti and those who
follow their development of logic.
First, I will summarise the main topic that most Buddhist logicians are con-
cerned with. In particular, I will introduce the notion of anuma¯na (inference) and
present some of its characteristics. Buddhist logicians disagree about the impor-
tance of anuma¯na (inference) and what its characteristics are. However, there are
some common characteristics that most of them attribute or presuppose and I will
present them in a summary form. Second, I will make a remark about the method-
ology for engaging with Buddhist logic. I will show that, given the difference in
writing style and language as well as the different questions that grabbed Buddhist
logicians from contemporary philosophers/logicians, merely regurgitating the ma-
terial in the way that it is presented is problematic if we are to take Buddhist logic
as capable of contributing to the contemporary debates. We need to extract or
abstract some ideas from the material in order to present it to a wider audience so
that genuine two-way conversations become possible. Third, I will set the agendas
for future research on Buddhist logic that can contribute to the global philosophy
of logic.
2 Anuma¯na (Inference)
Logic in the Indian Buddhist tradition developed as part of epistemology. Bud-
dhist logicians typically consider knowledge as a state of awareness that is war-
ranted (prama¯). They hold that what we are warranted to be aware of (i.e., what we
know) depends on how we come to be aware of it (i.e., how we come to know it).
For Buddhist logicians (against some of the non-Buddhist Indian philosophers),
pratyaks´a (perception) and anuma¯na (inference) are the only ways to come to a
state of awareness that can be said to be warranted. Pratyaks´a (perception) is
an immediate contact with particulars. It is said to be free of conception and it
is described causally. Conception is considered to involve universals. When we
conceive of a cow, for instance, we are said to be aware of the existence of a con-
ceptual object ‘cow’ which is a result of conceiving of a certain object as a cow.
A perceptual state is an awareness state of a thing itself and it is a state of aware-
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ness that is causally brought about by the encounter with that particular thing. On
the other hand, anuma¯na (inference) is considered to involve conception. For in-
stance, when we are aware of smoke on the mountain as a result of conceiving
of the thing that wafts around as smoke, we may infer that there is fire on that
mountain. When we become aware of the presence of fire on the mountain in this
way and it is true that there is fire there, smoke is said to serve a valid reason and
knowledge about the presence of fire is said to be brought about by inference.2
For the process of inferential reasoning to be productive of knowledge (or
‘valid’ as it is often described), inferential reasons (hetu) must satisfy three char-
acteristics (trairu¯pya). First, paks. adharmata¯: the reason must qualify the subject
(paks. a). In our example about fire and smoke on a mountain, it is the mountain
that is the subject and smoke (reason) must be present on that mountain. Second,
anvayavya¯pti: the reason must be present in at least one similar case (sapaks. a).3
For instance, smoke must be present in a kitchen with a wood-burning stove.
Third, vyatirekavya¯pti: the reason must be absent from all dissimilar instances
(vipaks. a). For instance, smoke must not be present in a misty lake.4
For Buddhist logicians, knowledge entails truth. But they don’t count the state
of awareness that happens to get things right as knowledge. They take the cog-
nitive process we undergo in acquiring knowledge to be a crucial aspect of that
knowledge. The three characteristics of inferential reason (trairu¯pya) serve as the
marks of the ‘validity’ of inferential cognitive process. But, Buddhist logicians
don’t distinguish a state of awareness that counts as knowledge from the cognitive
process that brings about that awareness. By ‘knowledge’, thus, Buddhist logi-
cians have in mind cognitive events rather than states. Their focus in talking about
anuma¯na (inference) is, thus, knowing inferentially, a particular kind of cognitive
event that entails truth.
Significance of this point in the backdrop of various contemporary positions
has been appreciated by a small number of scholars in the context of epistemol-
ogy.5 However, there is no study of Buddhist logic that emphasises the above point
and makes use of it in the context of logic.6 In this paper, I will articulate some
2Two of the main primary texts are Digna¯ga’s Prama¯n. asamuccaya and Dharmakı¯rti’s
Prama¯n. ava¯rttika. English translations (at least of the relevant passages) can be found in Hat-
tori (1968) and Tillemans (2000) respectively.
3This is the formulation of Digna¯ga. Dharmakı¯rti modifies this characteristic as: the reason
must be present in at least one similar case and only in similar cases. See Potter (1969).
4The secondary literature on these three characteristics is extensive. See, for instance,
Franco (1990), Katsura (1983, 1984), Oetke (1994a, 1994b), Patil (2009, 2010), Tanaka (2013),
Tillemans (1999) as well as several papers in Katsura and Steinkellner (2004).
5See, for instance, Matilal (1986) and Ganeri (2018) in the context of not just Buddhist but
broader Indian philosophical traditions and Stoltz (2007) in the context of Tibetan Buddhist tradi-
tion.
6The only exception I am aware of is Siderits (2003) who argues against the existence of the
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of the ways contemporary logicians/philosophers can make use of the material on
Buddhist logic. However, doing so requires sensibility to the methodology of en-
gaging with Buddhist material. So, in the next section, I will raise methodological
issues. I will then examine what contemporary logicians/philosophers can make
of Buddhist logic.
3 Methodology
We can be fine-grained about the levels of engagement with Buddhist material. In
this paper, however, I will limit myself to three levels of engagement. (I will also
limit my consideration to be applicable only to scholastic or philosophical texts
which make up a small proportion of material available in Buddhist tradition.)
Once I present these three levels, I will then examine what to make of the Buddhist
logic material.
At the first level, primary material needs to be presented. In the case of Bud-
dhist material, this is not an easy matter. The material is written in various Bud-
dhist languages, in particular the canonical languages: Sanskrit, Pa¯li, Tibetan,
(Buddhist) Chinese and (Buddhist) Japanese. It is no easy task to master the
language(s) let alone to understand the content of the material written in these
languages. The difficulty is not only to do with languages. Sometimes, works that
are referenced are now lost. At other times, the work we have access to is a copy
of the original but contains mistakes. So, presenting raw material is not an easy
task.
Second, once we have raw, primary material, we can provide an analysis or
analyses of the material. Engaging with Buddhist material at this level involves
interpretations. An analysis can be provided in order to highlight some ideas
contained in the material. In so doing, however, we are bringing in the interest
and concepts that we, as those who would like to make sense of the material,
have. Given that the material that is of interest is considered to be philosophical,
an analysis is quite often provided in terms of the concepts and terminologies used
by philosophers of the past and the present. Thus, how to understand Buddhist
material at this level often depends on how to understand philosophical concepts
and terms.
The first level of engagement is the level at which the scholars of Buddhism,
Buddhologists, operate. They are trained in the relevant language(s) in order to
understand primary material in the original language(s).7 But they almost always
study of logic in Buddhist (and broader Indian) traditions.
7Buddhologists are not necessarily steeped into the religious aspects of Buddhism. Their in-
terest may be to unravel the thought behind the scholastic or philosophical texts just like some
medieval scholars might work on the philosophy of Boethius or Duns Scotus or even Aquinas
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annotate their translations by providing analyses of the material as a way of ex-
plaining how to understand it. In recent years, philosophers (those who work
or are trained in philosophy departments) have started to engage with the Bud-
dhist material at this second level. With their firmer grasp of the concepts and
terminologies used by philosophers, they have provided sophisticated analyses of
Buddhist material.8
While the involvement of philosophers has enriched the activity of analysing
Buddhist material, it is not clear that there have been many fruitful dialogues
and exchanges between philosophers and Buddhologists (including those who are
trained in philosophy). The problem is two-fold. First, while there may not (or
may) be progress in philosophy, discussions in philosophy do move on.9 Buddhol-
ogists are not necessarily aware of this and, thus, not aware of the latest discus-
sions in philosophy.10 Second, philosophers not familiar with Buddhist material
have not largely been able to grasp Buddhist material. The problem is not neces-
sarily the unwillingness of philosophers at large but the way in which Buddhist
material is presented to philosophers.11 Philosophical concepts have been applied
to the analyses of Buddhist material in the hope that the contents can be grasped by
philosophers. However, this is essentially a mapping exercise. It shows that Bud-
dhist ideas and arguments can be understood in terms of a certain constellation of
concepts used by philosophers.12 This may be an important exercise for showing
that ideas and arguments similar to the ones found in (‘Western’) philosophy liter-
ature can also be found in Buddhist material. That may be an interesting historical
fact. Yet that, in itself, does not show what philosophers can do with those ideas.
If anything, what has been shown through this mapping exercise is that Buddhist
ideas are redundant for (contemporary) philosophers. For there to be fruitful di-
alogues and exchanges between philosophers and Buddhologists, thus, Buddhist
ideas need to be presented in a way that can have an uptake by philosophers.
The third level of engagement with Buddhist materials is then to somewhat
abstract Buddhist ideas and arguments and recontextualise them in relation to con-
temporary literature. At this level, we are, strictly speaking, not analysing what is
in the texts. We are no longer in the territory of excavating the history of ideas and
we are essentially leaving the texts behind. Rather, we are considering what we
without being overtly religious in doing so.
8See, for instance, Carpenter (2014), Cowherds (2011), Siderits (2007) and Westerhoff (2018).
9For a pessimistic view, see Chalmers (2015). For an optimistic view, see Stoljar (2017).
10Numerous examples can be given to show this. Given the limited space available, I refrain
from mentioning them.
11I don’t deny the claim made by Van Norden (2017) that vast majority of philosophers haven’t
shown any willingness to engage with ‘non-Western’ including Buddhist material. However, I
reject any suggestion that the problem here is only the unwillingness of philosophers.
12For a similar discussion in the context of the sociology of sciences, see Law and Lin (2017).
Thanks go to Luis Reyes-Galindo for the reference.
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can do with the material in our own contexts. For Buddhist material to be taken up
as philosophical resources outside of the history of philosophy, this is what needs
to happen. If there is any hope of two-way dialogues between (contemporary)
philosophers and Buddhologists, Buddhist material must be presented in a way
that can contribute to the current debates in philosophy.
4 Buddhist Logic from a Global Perspective
What could be done if we were to engage in two-way dialogues? As I will show
in this section, we can challenge some of the widely accepted philosophical ideas
about the nature of logic from Buddhist perspectives. These challenges may be
radical but fruitful in the context of understanding the nature of logic.
4.1 Psychologism
Psychologism is the view that logic describes, and thus is dependent on, our rea-
soning processes. It is largely a rejected view in contemporary literature on the
philosophy of logic. It has been argued that if logic were descriptive in this way,
it would be hard to conceive of its normative significance. That is, if logic is
concerned with reasoning, understood as a cognitive process, it may tell us what
inferences we, in fact, perform but it cannot tell us what inferences we ought to
make. Since logic specifies the norms our reasoning practice must meet, it cannot
be descriptive of reasoning processes. Thus, so it has been argued, logic must be
independent of those processes.13
This anti-psychologistic stance is hardly contested these days.14 For Buddhist
logicians, however, the primary focus in their logical investigations are cognitive
processes that constitute knowledge-producing events. Debates about what prin-
ciples we should accept are conducted in that context. This comes out clearly in
the debate between Bha¯vivaka (500-578 CE) and Candrakı¯rti (7th CE – dates un-
known) as appears in Candrakı¯rti’s Prasannapada¯ I.15 They debate about whether
there are any consequences we ought to accept once we accept certain premises.
Candrakı¯rti, with his deflationary program, denies that there are any such conse-
quences because there is nothing that we ought to do. Bha¯vivaka disagrees and
argues that there are normative constraints that must be present in our reason-
ing practice if we can claim that we are rational.16 Details of the debate do not
13Frege (1893), Husserl (1900).
14See, however, Gabbay and Woods (2008), Pelletier and Elio (2005), Pelletier, Elio and Han-
son (2008), and Rott (2008) who have questioned anti-psychologism.
15A translation can be found in MacDonald (2015).
16For this analysis of the debate, see Tillemans (2016). The context of the debate is prasan˙ga
which is a variation of reductio rather than trairu¯pya, however.
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concern us here. One thing to highlight is that, in the process of arguing for his
position, Bha¯vivaka tries to show that contraposition must be accepted as ‘valid’.
He argues for this not by demonstrating the structure of truth (aka Frege) but by
investigating what inferences we do perform and accept. He thus advocates a form
of psychologism.
5 A Priori
Once we question anti-psychologism, another important issue becomes salient.
That is the a priori nature of logic. There are several ways in which logic is
thought to be a priori. First, logic is thought to be a priori in the sense that our
experiences do not invalidate logical principles. This notion of apriority has been
challenged in the context of quantum mechanics where the behaviour of some
particles does not seem to obey the principles of classical logic.17 However, many
of these challengers have come to the view that logic is ultimately a priori.18 And
it is hard to see anyone who would argue that an observation of someone or even
a large number of people reasoning invalidly should trigger a rejection or revision
of logical principles.
Second, logic is sometimes thought to be a priori in the sense that logical prin-
ciples are not derivable from any particular cognition involved in reasoning. This
is the view that Kant argued for. He assumed that logical rules are those ‘without
which no use of the understanding would be possible at all’ (Jäsche Logic: 12).19
For him, this means that logical rules are the conditions for the possibility of un-
derstanding as such: without logical rules, understanding in general is impossible.
Kant infers from this that logical rules are necessary rules for the understanding.
In particular, they do not depend on any particular cognition. That is, they do not
depend on the contingency of experience. Thus, for Kant, logical principles are
canon but not organon of understanding.
Third, logic is sometimes thought to be a priori in the sense that logical prin-
ciples must be in place for the development and testing of theories, whether em-
pirical or otherwise, to take place. Resnik (1997) argues that logical principles
function as the mechanism to generate and manipulate empirical data but they are
insulated from any empirical refutation and confirmation.20 Frege thought of logic
17See Bueno & Colyvan (2004), Putnam (1979), Quine (1953).
18See Shapiro (2000) in the case of Quine, Putnam (1994) in the case of Putnam. Bueno &
Colyvan (2004) may be the only ones who hold quantum mechanics to be a counter-example to
the a priori nature of logic.
19A translation can be found in Young (1992).
20Resnik’s view echos the neo-Kantian view of Friedman (1997, 2000, 2001) who argues that
there must be a priori principles that make the development and testing of empirical theories
possible.
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to be a priori in a similar manner. For him, logical principles are the standard in
terms of which judgements about the validity of one’s reasoning can be made.21
For logical principles to be such a standard, however, they would have to be in
place before they can be applicable to the evaluation of reasoning. So logical
principles must be a priori for them to set the standard for reasoning.
Buddhist logicians can be understood as rejecting all three forms of a priori.
As we saw before, they do not distinguish a state of awareness that counts as
knowledge from the cognitive process that brings about that state. For them, when
one can be said to have knowledge, they are thereby justified. Justification is
not an extra ingredient that must be added for a state of awareness to count as
knowledge.22 So there is nothing that could be in place before it is applied to
the evaluation of the inferential process that brings it about. Hence, Buddhist
logicians can be understood as rejecting the third form of a priori. But this also
means that there is nothing that can be articulated without analysing particular
knowledge events. So, they also reject the second form of a priori. Finally, if there
is nothing outside of the inferential process against which inferential processes
can be evaluated, ‘validity’ is something that is embedded in people’s inferential
knowing. If so, rejection or revision of logical principles can be triggered only by
the observation of the processes of inferential knowing events. Hence, Buddhist
logicians can also be understood as rejecting the first form of a priori. Thus, they
can be seen as rejecting all three forms of a priori as applied to logic.
6 Normative Externalism
Once anti-psychologism and the a priori nature of logic are challenged, a few
other issues become salient. For the rest of the paper, I will discuss two such
issues: normative externalism and non-systematicity.
First normative externalism. Logic is often thought to be normative in the
sense that it provides norms for thought or reasoning.23 This common view has
been challenged by Harman (1986). He argues that logic as a science of entailment
is a separate subject matter from reasoning. In order to meet Harman’s challenge,
MacFarlane (2004) proposes bridge principles that connect facts about logical
validity with norms for reasoning so that logic can be shown to be normative.
He argues that if a bridge principle can be formulated, logic can be shown to be
normative. A bridge principle has the following form:
If P1, ..., Pn |= Q then Φ(P1, ..., Pn, Q)
21See MacFarlane (2002).
22See Stoltz (2007) who brings out this aspect of Buddhist logic from a Tibetan perspective.
23See, for instance, Kant’s Jäsche Logic.
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‘where the antecedent states a ‘fact’ about logical consequence and the consequent
takes the form of a normative claim featuring the agent’s attitudes towards the
propositions in question’ (Steinberger (2016): 389).24 Thus, a bridge principle
bridges ‘the logical concept of entailment and the epistemological concepts of
inference and belief’ (Steinberger (2016): 390).
Steingerber (2016) shows that no plausible bridge principle can be formu-
lated.25 I won’t rehearse his reasons for the impossibility of formulating bridge
principles. I note, however, that Buddhist logicians, at least the earlier ones such
as Digna¯ga and Dharmakı¯rti, would not account for the normative status of logi-
cal principles underling argumentation and reasoning by connecting logical facts
with norms for reasoning. The form of bridge principles suggests that, for an ac-
count of entailment to be normative, it must be internalised in one’s epistemic
attitudes that play a normative role in inferential practice. Thus, a bridge principle
is predicated on the idea that accepting an account of entailment is to live up to the
standard that it sets for our inferential practice. Following Weatherson (2019), I
call this internalisation of entailment in inferences normative internalism. I think
it is fair to say that normative internalism is commonly accepted or presupposed
in literature on logic and its related fields.
In contrast, some (though not all) Buddhist logicians, in particular Dharmakı¯rti,
hold that it is the external world that sets the standard for our inferences. They are,
thus, normative externalists (again to use the terminology of Weatherson (2019)).
For them, however, the external world is not something that can be internalised
in our epistemic life. Buddhist logicians (and Buddhists generally) are sceptical
about our ‘inner life’ which is seen as a construction with the use of conceptu-
alisation given that they think of conceptualisation as involving universals which
are thought not to occupy reality. They hold that it would have to be the exter-
nal world to which we must be responsive in theorising about how we ought to
reason.26 Our inner life is far from something that can set a standard for our infer-
ential practices or any of our conduct; in fact, it is to be corrected. Thus, Buddhist
logicians can be understood as rejecting normative internalism and advocating
normative externalism.
24MacFarlane (2004) formulates it slightly differently. According to him, a bridge principle
has the following form: If A, B |= C then (normative claim about believing A, B, and C) (p. 6).
MacFarlane’s formulation does not guarantee that it is logical facts that are connected with norms
for reasoning as A and B do not necessarily express logical facts. I have, thus, used Steinberger’s
formulation.
25MacFarlane seems to have also abandoned the project of showing the normative status of logic
via bridge principles.
26I take it that this is one aspect of Dharmakı¯rti’s notion of svabha¯vapratibandha (natural rela-
tion). For a discussion of svabha¯vapratibandha, see, for instance, Dunne (2004).
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7 Non-Systematicity
One thing we notice when we start studying Buddhist logic is the absence of
mathematics. Logic in Buddhist (and, generally, Indian) traditions did not develop
with mathematics. What exactly mathematics does to logic is perhaps a moot
question. One thing to note is that it makes logic somewhat systematic. Given the
lack of mathematics, examining Buddhist logic, thus, gives us an opportunity to
consider how systematic logic should or should not be.
Consider the deflationary program of Candrakı¯rti. For him, all there is in
search of truth are the beliefs and opinions of people on the street. By exten-
sion, all there is in search of validity are people’s beliefs and opinions. Then it
is possible to think that a logical form and its instances could come apart. It is
possible that people judge the validity (or invalidity) of a logical form differently
from the validity (or invalidity) of its instances. If someone wishes to show that
some logical form is invalid, they cannot simply provide a counter-example. They
would need to demonstrate that people on the street do not judge that logical form
as valid. In this way, it is possible to develop a view of logic that does not treat
logical forms systematically.27
8 Conclusion
If we examine Buddhist logic not from an internal perspective (internal to Bud-
dhist tradition) but from a broader, somewhat global, perspective, what can be
found? We can find resources that can be used to challenge views of the na-
ture of logic according to which logic is anti-psychologistic, a priori, internally
normative and/or systematic. Careful study of the reasons offered by Buddhist
logicians against these views help to shed critical light on the orthodox presup-
positions about the nature of logic. Given that logic is largely conceived of as
anti-psychologistic, a priori, internally normative and systematic in contemporary
literature, the result of this investigation is significant. If the views of Buddhist
logicians can be shown to be reasonable, it will seriously challenge the contem-
porary orthodoxy; if these views are shown to lack coherence, it will provide re-
sources for considering why logic must be understood according to the contempo-
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